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Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is describing the ideas that have influenced current Russian and 
Spanish relations with the European Union (EU), determining the extent to which it has been 
perceived as a security issue, and explaining the contents of those perceptions. This is achieved 
by applying textual analysis to some of the main official statements by the top foreign and 
security policy decision-makers in both countries, Vladimir Putin and José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero. After studying Spain and Russia’s identification with Europe, their foreign policy 
interests for relations with the EU, and the security component of those interests, I use Buzan’s 
concept of security sectors in order to explain where Europe has been located by both countries 
in the continuum “source of threat – provider of security”. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is describing the ideas that have influenced current Russian 
and Spanish relations with the European Union (EU), determining the extent to which it 
has been perceived as a security issue, and explaining the contents of those perceptions. 
This is achieved by applying textual analysis to some of the main official statements by 
the top foreign and security policy decision-makers in both countries, President of the 
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Spanish Government —i.e. 
Prime Minister— José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, as well as several other major 
documents approved by them in the period 2000-2006 and 2004-2006, respectively.2 It 
is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of either Russia-EU or Spain-EU 
relations, but only an overview based on state-approved narratives.  
I start from the assumption that the ideas that security policy-makers have about the 
outside world, and more specifically their views on other actors in the international 
system, influence their threat perceptions and the security policies elaborated by them. 
This approach has been used by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) scholars3 and, more 
recently, by the constructivist approach to International Relations (IR). While both 
agree that ideational factors are at least as important as material factors in order to 
explain state behaviour, their concept of the former is different. FPA takes foreign 
policy decision-makers as the ultimate cause of policies; in this case, we specifically 
focus on their ideas about an “Other”, the EU, and how these perceptions determine the 
security policies they implement (fig. 1). Constructivists prefer to emphasize the 
constitutive power of ideas themselves, internalized as “identities” by human groups 
and societies; according to their holist ontological conception, identities cannot be 
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reduced to the ideas of individuals, even political leaders.4 However, I believe that these 
social identities only have a real influence in actual decisions as long as they are 
accepted and internalized by decision-makers; therefore, I study official documents 
rather than a broader range of sources, as other authors have done.5  
 
Fig. 1: The influence of ideas on the making of security policy 
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The interest of choosing Spain and Russia as case studies for comparison, in spite 
of their obvious differences, lies in the history of their relations with Europe. Having 
sometimes been “inside” and sometimes “outside” Europe,6 this has been one of the 
main “Others” in relation to which these two countries have shaped their threat 
perceptions and sense of security.7 Further common features are their location in the 
periphery of Europe and their readaptation to a new, democratic identity after decades 
of authoritarian rule. The question of Russia’s and Spain’s European identity has 
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therefore been determined by political circumstances rather than just their geographic 
position; during those authoritarian periods, they were excluded from the political 
concept of “Europe” as a community of shared values, developed by European 
institutions such as the EU or the Council of Europe. 
The first part of this paper deals with issues of identification with Europe, that is, 
the extent to which the current Russian and Spanish leaders have considered their 
countries to be “European”, especially with regard to the values associated with 
European integration. Secondly, I study how these conceptions have been translated into 
specific foreign policy interests for relations with the EU. Third, I focus on the security 
component, describing how the EU has been seen with regard to national security and 
defence policy. Finally, I use Buzan’s concept of security sectors8 in order to explain 
where Europe has been located by both countries in the continuum “source of threat – 
provider of security”.  
 
Are We Part of Europe? Areas and Degrees of Identification 
Since the very beginning of his term in office, Zapatero has usually referred to 
European integration in completely positive terms: “a process of peace, liberty, progress 
and welfare”.9 According to him, Europe acted as a major reference for Spaniards 
during their historical fight for freedoms over the past centuries;10 more recently, 
membership of the EU constituted the legal basis for Spain’s stable and prosperous 
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evolution, together with the 1978 democratic constitution.11 With regard to the 
economy, the “European social model” and the emphasis on inter-territorial cohesion, 
based on the solidarity between the most and the least developed areas, are seen as 
having greatly helped Spain’s growth and development.12   
The potentially most problematic issue, a perception by Spanish citizens that EU 
membership restricted their rights or national/regional identities, is considered not to be 
the case. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the Union allows for a 
Europe “united in diversity”, where the different cultures are to be respected:13 “Europe 
is not, then, a risk for our cultures and identity, but the best way to preserve and 
promote them”.14  
A consequence of this conception is Zapatero’s stated foreign policy objective of 
bringing Spain back to “Europe’s core”,15 in contrast to the greater emphasis given by 
his predecessor José María Aznar to relations with the United States. Aznar’s support 
for the war in Iraq —apart from the many reasons against the war itself— is regarded as 
having been contrary to Spain’s natural place in international politics: together with 
other European powers and EU members, like France or Germany.  
Putin’s Russia could be seen as almost the opposite case to Zapatero’s Spain. While 
for the latter belonging to the EU is a source of strength that increases its world 
projection, Moscow still considers itself as a world power that wishes to be a centre of 
influence in international relations on its own right. In spite of having “lost” its former 
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empire, it does not accept to become just one more of the European or, for that matter, 
Asian countries, like the other former Soviet republics have done.16  
Furthermore, being “one of the largest Eurasian powers”, Moscow also pursues a 
multi-vectoral foreign policy which requires “an optimal combination of efforts along 
all vectors”,17 not exclusively focusing on any geographic area. The CIS members —
being Russia’s traditional area of influence— are still considered the priority partners18; 
relations with Europe will be deepened only as long as it advances Russian interests, but 
not as and end in itself, as in the Spanish case.  
Russia’s depiction of Europe is therefore a mixed one: the EU is seen at the same 
time as a rival for Russia and as a potential partner on specific issues. It is also not as 
value-laden as the Spanish view, but limited to pragmatic benefits. While Spain accepts 
the influence of Europe because it is seen as both natural and beneficial to the country, 
Russia rejects as a matter of principle to be subject to any influence but its own.  
To sum up, Spain’s identification with Europe is complete; while Russia only 
wholly identifies itself with “Eurasia”, a concept that is roughly equivalent to the 
territory of the CIS. Therefore, Madrid bases its relations with Europe on the principle 
of compromise, as a member of the EU and part of the European integration project; 
Moscow, on the other hand, is not a full member of the “political Europe” —not 
belonging to its most important organization, the EU,— and logically conducts its 
European policy according to its own national interest.  
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Fig. 2: Concepts associated with “Europe” by Spanish and Russian leaders 
 
 
 
What is Europe to Us? Relations with the EU and National Interests 
As we have seen above, Zapatero has prioritized Spain’s European identity above other 
traditional partners; consequently, showing a “clear Europeanist compromise” was the 
first in a list of tasks for Spanish foreign policy that he made public in his inauguration 
address, before relations with Latin America, the Mediterranean and the United States.19  
Spain has wanted to appear in the vanguard of European construction with regard to 
projects such as the EU constitutional treaty, which received the full support of 
Zapatero’s government:20 a quick ratification was intended to reflect Spain’s new, more 
pro-European foreign policy, as well as the gratitude for the political and economic 
benefits that the country has received since it joined the Union.21 
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In contrast to the Spanish optimistic view, the views of the Russian leadership on 
Europe when Putin came to power were still affected by the so-called “Kosovo 
syndrome”. The NSC expressed concern about the attempts to establish “the domination 
of Western developed countries, led by the USA, in the international community”.22 EU 
members were presented as just an extension of American power, and therefore trying 
to diminish Russian influence in world politics.  
However, this was not in itself a complete denial of Russia’s European identity, but 
only as far as “Europe” or European organizations were seen as dominated by rival 
powers, not allowing for Russian participation. While it was admitted that “[i]ntegrated 
associations […] are becoming a significant factor of regional and sub-regional security 
and peacemaking”, it was also said that “[i]ntegration processes, in particular, in the 
Euro-Atlantic region are quite often pursued on a selective and limited basis”.23  
This apparent contradiction was also shown with regard to relations with the EU. 
While steps such as the enlargement to Eastern Europe and the development of a 
security and defence policy were seen with caution by Moscow —warning that it would 
“seek due respect for its interests” 24—, the EU was also described as “one of [Russia’s] 
main political and economic partners”, with which it wanted “an intensive, stable and 
long-term cooperation”.25 
The ambiguity of the official discourse has continued in the last few years. In 2001, 
the importance of respect to Russia’s national interests was repeated; however, it was 
also necessary to “breathe new life into our relations with European and other 
international structures”.26 Furthermore, “efforts to build up a partnership with the 
European Union will become even more important. Integration with Europe is one of 
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the key areas of our foreign policy”.27 In this way, the word to describe Russia’s aims 
changed from “cooperation” in 2000 to “integration” a year later. Did Russia aspired to 
membership of the EU? 
This was clarified in the 2002 address: integration was intended to be limited and 
restricted to economic issues. “Here our consistent position and numerous steps towards 
integration with Europe are clear. We will continue active work with the European 
Union to form a single economic space”.28 Free movement of citizens was also 
mentioned in 2003, with regard to the Kaliningrad issue; together with the economic 
space, they constituted Russia’s objectives in dealing with the Union.29 In 2004, energy 
exports —especially through the new “North European gas pipeline”— were included 
in the main areas for Russian-EU relations.  
Therefore, what was being required from Brussels was just the continuation of 
political dialogue in the most important areas for Moscow’s interests; but there was no 
aspirations of being accepted into the EU, which for Russia —contrary to what we have 
said about Spain— would mean downgrading its status as an independent world power. 
In 2006, the EU was described again as just a “partner” for Russia, although the biggest 
one.30 
These limited objectives, perhaps paradoxically, made it possible for Moscow to 
accept EU enlargement to the Baltic States as an opportunity, instead of a threat. “The 
expansion of the European Union should not just bring us closer geographically, but 
also economically and spiritually. […] This means new markets and new investment. 
Generally, it means new possibilities for the future of Greater Europe”.31 With this new 
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concept, Russia tried to replace the idea of “two Europes” —one inside and another 
outside the Union,— preferring to highlight common interests instead. However, this 
does not change the fact that, when disagreements arise, Russia will choose the option 
that best suits its national interest, which as we have said is its guiding principle in 
relations with the EU.  
The often mentioned “Putin’s pragmatism” also means that Russia’s European 
identity can also be instrumentally used to achieve foreign policy goals: for example, in 
response to criticism from the West on the state of freedom, democracy and human 
rights in Russia, Putin replied that the country had accepted those values along with the 
rest of European nations, with which it shared centuries of a common history.32 This 
points out that the ideas that political leaders refer to when making decisions are often 
not determined by their own personal beliefs, but by how useful these arguments are in 
order to convince their audiences.  
 
Does Europe Make Us Any More Secure? Threat Assessment and Security Policy 
Spain considers that the integration project represented by the EU has increased the 
security of the continent, by “consolidating peace and democracy in Europe, and 
eliminating once and for all war and dictatorships from our countries”.33 The priority 
given to Europe in Zapatero’s foreign policy is also taken to security policy: “In matters 
of security and defence, Europe is our area of priority interest; we are Europe and our 
security is unbreakably linked to the continent’s security”.34  
The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was seen as 
one of the reasons for Spain to assume a greater role in the Union, in order to 
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“increasing the [EU] defence and security capabilities for the benefit of its citizens, and 
playing a relevant role for world peace”.35 The first task for Spanish defence policy in 
the international arena was therefore supporting the ESDP, more specifically the 2010 
Helsinki Headline Goal, the “Battle Groups”, the European Capabilities Action Plan and 
the European Defence Agency;36 Spain also promised its full support to the EU —as 
“one of its more compromised partners”— in the fight against terrorism.37  
The EU was not only seen as a security provider for Spain because of the ESDP. 
Other instruments such as international cooperation policies were also considered to 
contribute to that aim: for example, helping “the development of our Eastern and 
Southern neighbours” would make these areas more stable and prosperous, which in 
turn would increase the security of Europe as a whole.38 Assistance from the EU was 
also considered very important in order to face the main “soft security” risk for Spain 
coming from those areas, that is, a growing illegal immigration that increasingly 
exceeds the country’s material capacity of dealing with it.39  
Russian views have been determined by their perception of European powers as 
potential rivals together with the United States. As the NSC said, “the attempts of other 
states to hinder the strengthening of Russia as a centre of influence in the multipolar 
world, prevent the implementation of its national interests and weaken its positions in 
Europe, the Middle East, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Asia Pacific” were no 
less than a threat to national security.40 Although this might be considered a rhetorical 
statement, what is real is the feeling that Russian leaders had about the danger to their 
identity as a great power: an European alignment with Washington could potentially 
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marginalize Russia from the most important issues, forcing them to resort to a 
“balancing” strategy by, for example, strengthening relations with China.  
However, relations with some European countries, especially France and Germany, 
have also been emphasized in order to try to counter U.S. policies, most recently with 
regard to the Iraq War. In this way, the Moscow-Beijing and the Moscow-Paris-Berlin 
axes are used as alternative ways of balancing the West or the United States, 
respectively; but this points out to the limitations of these agreements, which tend to be 
short-term and limited to specific issues. Europe appears, in this way, as a threat to 
Russia’s great power status and as an ally against that very same threat, when it comes 
from the American superpower.  
With regard to security institutions in Europe, Moscow’s aim has been creating “a 
stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation”,41 which 
adequately took into account Russia’s status and interests. The OSCE, for example, was 
defended because it was perceived as an institution where Russia and Western countries 
enjoyed the same status. On the other hand, NATO —of which Russia was not a 
member, but only a “partner” with limited rights— was considered the main military 
instrument for extending American and Western European influence, therefore ignoring 
Russian interests; the Alliance’s enlargement was even described as a “military 
threat”.42 This is why Russia tried to develop the role of the OSCE in order to make it 
the cornerstone of the European security architecture, instead of NATO.43 
The wave of “colour revolutions” in the CIS space, especially those in Georgia and 
Ukraine, has nonetheless changed this scenario. Despite their recent disagreement over 
the Iraq War, Brussels joined Washington in supporting these regime changes; which 
Moscow perceived as a blow to Russian-European cooperation. Therefore, now 
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Europe’s discourse on issues such as the state of freedom and human rights in Russia is 
seen in a new, potentially threatening sense by Russian leaders; especially given the 
rhetoric of the current U.S. Administration about the “spread of democracy”. While it 
seems clear that Russia’s case is not Ukraine’s, once again it is the feeling of threat, 
rather than the actual danger, what really matters for the level of security that is 
perceived from the Kremlin.  
 
Conclusion 
Following Buzan, we can classify Spanish and Russian security perceptions about the 
EU into several groups, according to the military, political, economic and societal 
sectors.  
First, with regard to the traditional or military sector, as we have seen, Spain 
considers that membership of the EU contributes to improve its national capabilities, 
fostering cooperation among members in the framework of the ESDP. Russia does not 
consider any European country as a military threat, but only shows caution about the 
future course of the EU defence initiatives, which are still uncompleted,  
Secondly, in the political sector, Madrid identifies the EU with support to its 
democratic system; it also considers that its member status contributes to increase its 
world projection and power, which would be well below their current level had it not 
joined the Union. On the other hand, Moscow bases its self-perception a great power on 
its own national resources; accordingly, when dealing with the EU or other European 
organizations like NATO, it does not want to be assimilated to less powerful states, but 
enjoy a special status that acknowledges what Russia is. This is related to the 
consideration of critical remarks on the current regime by foreign governments as 
 14 
interferences in Russia’s internal affairs, which threaten the same great power status that 
Moscow wants to promote.  
The economic sector is the only one that is clearly viewed in a positive light by 
both Madrid and Moscow. While the former is conscious of the role played by EU 
funds in the development of the Spanish economy, the latter is also confident about its 
role as an energy supplier to Europe, which is decisively contributing to its current high 
growth rates.  
Finally, regarding societal sector problems, Spain considers once again that EU 
assistance is decisive, as in the case of controlling illegal immigration flows; Russia, on 
the other hand, finds in the EU regulations an obstacle for the free movement of the 
citizens of Kaliningrad. EU membership is also seen by Spain as compatible with the 
national/regional identities of Spanish citizens, while Russia’s Eurasian territory and 
history prevent itself from fully accepting Western European culture as its own.  
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